1 In the loose sense reductionism means explaining everything relevant to a given field of inquiry in terms of a single, all-pervasive factor outside that field, which is necessary to a proper understanding of that field. For example, proponents of a double aspect theory of the relationship between brain states and mental states might argue that every mental state is directly correlated to some brain state; yet this would not require them to treat the two types of states as identical, or to advocate the actual description of all mental states in terms of brain states. Strict, eliminative reductionists, by contrast, believe one special way of explaining something is not only necessary, but self-sufficient, so that it can actually replace, or explain away all other possible explanations. Proponents of strict reductionism would argue that all talk of mental states is pointless, since nothing but brain states exists or has any value.
If we accept this distinction between explanatory and eliminative forms of reductionism, then the question occupying our attention can be rephrased in two ways: loosely, Does Kant regard morality as the single explanatory factor in terms of which all that is necessary to religion can be explained? and strictly, Does Kant believe religion can be tf explained away" as nothing but a special form of morality? In other words, does Kant think morality is necessary for all true religion, and if so, does he also think it is sufficient?
To many readers of Kant the answer to our question seems so obvious that they never bother even to pose the question. Kant clearly does reduce religion to morality (in both senses), so the story goes, for he consistently stipulates in defining religion that "Religion is ... the recognition of all duties as divine commands." 2 Does this not require us to regard religion as nothing but a special way of looking at man's duties -i. e., at his morality? Indeed, we need go no further than the title of Kant's most important book on religion, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, to see that he assumes right from the start that religion can and ought to be viewed only within a narrow set of rational limits -a reduction if ever there was one! Likewise, if we open the book itself, we find that on the first few pages of the first edition Preface Kant tells us morality is not based on religion; rather, religion is based on morality. And throughout the rest of the book, he repeatedly passes judgment on religious beliefs and practises by asking about their value for the moral improvement of the religious believer.
We should not be surprised, therefore, to find interpreters as prestigious as Ernst Cassirer, whose study of Kant's life and works is usually quite trustworthy, assuming an affirmative answer to the question at issue without supporting his view with any textual evidence:
... the Kantian system does not in general recognize the philosophy of religion as a fully independent member of the system, as a way of looking at things that is idiosyncratic and rests on autonomous and independent assumptions ... [Instead,] the substance of his philosophy of religion comprises for him only a confirmation of and a corollary of the substance of his ethics. Religion 'within the limits of reason alone* ... has no essential content other than that of pure morality. The conversion of pure rational religion into pure ethics is required ... 3 Moreover, it is not uncommon, especially in brief summaries of Kant's philosophy of religion, to read explicit statements of an even more dogmatic kind, such as when Edwards proclaims: "... we have in Kant the complete reduction of religion to morality." However, if we put aside this long tradition and examine Kant's own claims with an open mind, we will find that the traditional, unequivocally affirmative answer to our question is not faithful to his true intentions. Sadly, it comes so close to a proper understanding of the points Kant was actually trying to make, that its subtle distortions have, to my knowledge, remained virtually unchallenged. In order to reveal these distortions, let us first look more closely at the three sources most often used to defend the traditional myth of eliminative reductionism: the title and the first Preface to Kant's book on religion, and his definition of religion. For a proper understanding of these is indispensable if we are to understand Kant's intentions. We can then examine in section III the general content of his system of religion. Although a thoroughgoing interpretation of the details of this religious system is beyond the scope of this study, such a general overview will provide us with enough evidence to make a fair assessment in section IV of the extent to which Kant's theory of religion reduces religion to morality.
II. Prolegomena to Kant's System of Religion
There are two common assumptions about the title of Kant's book on religion (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft) which, when made, virtually determine in advance that Kant's views will be interpreted strictly, in terms of eliminative reductionism. Yet, as we shall see, both of these assumptions are Kant "shared with the rationalists of his century the conviction that reason alone is sufficient for all religious knowledge"; so he infers that, because Kant regards morality as "the essence of 'true religion'", it must also be true that "nothing else really matters" for Kant (p. 46). As a result, he concludes his discussion with a (completely unjustified) summary of Kant's view which implies that it should be relegated to the scrap heap: "With a mere definition of religion Kant believes he has shown that no 'true religion' contains a belief that God really exists ..., that no 'true religion' contains a reliable and self-authenticating revelation, and that no 'true religion' makes a place for prayer, ritual, or any other expression of unique duties to God" (p. 52). Not only does Edwards fail to recognize that, as we shall see in section III, Kant does preserve a necessary space for such elements in all true religion, but he also completely ignores the fact that Kant supports each of his claims with arguments (not mere definitions; see note 18 below). Another typical example of a blatantly reductionist interpretation of Kant's theory of religion is Kwan Tze-wan's Kant's 'Humanistic' Conception of Religion, Tunghai Journal 24 (June 1983), pp. 95-118. Kwan repeatedly adds words like "nothing but", "only", or "just" to Kant's own words to make them appear to defend eliminative reductionism (see especially pp. 110-111), when nothing in Kant's text indicates that this is his intention. Kwan sets up an absolute dichotomy between an historical fact and its symbolic meaning, as if no event could be both at once! Thus, in discussing the "symbolic meaning" of Kant's idea of "Christus", he says "God or Christus ... is just a human fiction, a projection, an idea or an Ideal" (p. 111). He concludes by saying that for Kant "No God will tell us if we are really on our way toward a pure rational faith ... Only the human conscience" (p. 112). But this misses Kant's point, which, as we shall see, is that if God tells us, it must be through such rational channels as the conscience. utterly opposed to Kant's expressed intentions. The first assumption is that Grenzen refers to a strict limitation placed on religion by reason -a limitation which (like all true "limits", e. g. in mathematics) establishes an absolute barrier which cannot in any way be overcome. Yet Kant explains elsewhere that Grenzen must not be regarded in such a strict or one-sided way: "Bounds [Grenzen] ... always presuppose a space outside a certain definite place and inclosing it; limits [Schranken] do not require this, but are mere negations which affect a quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete."
5 Despite his reputation to the contrary, which developed as a result of the unfortunate "patchwork" interpretations of his work, Kant is usually very careful to give precise meanings to the terms he uses, and then to stick by those meanings. So we should give serious consideration to the implications of this passage for the title of Kant's book. If Kant had wanted to say that reason imposes limits upon religion which must not be surpassed, then he would have surely used the term Schranken. His use of Grenzen rather indicates that he has in mind a boundary (like a fence dividing two portions of land), on either side of which we can find legitimate (though different) aspects of one and the same territory (viz. religion). On one side we find what is rationally necessary and on the other, what is empirically real. Kant's title, then, does not reveal a desire to force all aspects of religion into a single, rational mold; rather, it reflects his intent to examine one side of a fundamentally two-sided issue.
The second assumption regarding the title of Kant's book concerns the proper interpretation of the phrase bloßen Vernunft^ which has traditionally been rendered into English either as "Reason Alone" or as "Mere Reason". The former choice, adopted by Greene and Hudson in their standard translation of this work, would clearly imply self-sufficiency, and hence a tendency towards strict reductionism on Kant's part. Yet, such a translation not only stretches the literal meaning of this common German word, but it neglects an important nuance in the original. The word bloßen can mean either "mere" (thus indicating that something more is possible and perhaps even required for full satisfaction) or "naked". Greene and Hudson were certainly aware of this dual meaning, since they actually used "naked reason" as the translation for bloßen Vernunft at several points in their text (see e. g. Religion 10/9); nevertheless, they suppressed this implication entirely in their translation of the title itself. Perhaps their reason was that, if Kant had wanted to use "naked" in his title, he almost certainly would have used the more explicit word, nackt. There is, however, a third alternative which does not seem to have occurred to any of Kant's translators. For there is one English word which parallels the dual meaning of bloßen almost exactly: that word is "bare", which, just like bloßen, can mean either "mere" or "naked". 6 When these two mistaken assumptions are brought to light, a more balanced translation comes into view: Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason is the best English translation of what Kant himself intended to say in the title of his book. That Kant's use of bloßen was an intentional, though covert, way of referring to nakedness can be clearly seen by taking note of the fact that in the text itself Kant makes use on several occasions of the analogy of "the religion of reason" being like a naked body which can be rendered presentable, or socially acceptable, only by dressing it in some type of clothing (see e.g. Religion 195/183). If Kant had not wanted to hint at such an analogy in his title, he almost certainly would have used his more technical term, reinen ("pure") to refer to the inner or "invisible" aspects of all true religion. Similarly, that Kant's use of Grenzen is meant to imply territorial boundaries, rather than absolute limits, is suggested by other, related metaphors, such as when he considers what happens when one side "trespasses" on the other side's property, or "imports something" from the other side for use within "its own economy", or "declares war on" the other side, etc. (see e.g. Religion 9-10/9, 13/12).
The "double aspect" character of Kant's system of religion is also made clear by several other analogies used from time to time in Religion. Kant consistently refers to "the pure religion of reason" not as itself constituting everything necessary for true religion, but rather as providing us with its necessary core or "kernel". Other (i. e., non-moral) aspects of religion are never regarded by Kant as identical to false religion; rather, they become false only when the religious person fails to recognize them as the "shell" or "vehicle" (i.e., as the means) through which the "kernel" or "canon" (i. e., the end) of religion can be promoted, and as a result detaches them from their proper grounding in morality.
7 All these analogies imply that, as we shall see in more detail in section III, Kant is thinking not about exclusiveness, but about the proper priority between two necessary elements. Kant gives these two elements a number of different names, the most common of which are "faith" and "pure religion" as the two aspects of "religion". (These two senses of "religion" must be kept in mind if we are to avoid misunderstanding Kant's view; so we will return to them again shortly.) Indeed, just as each of Kant's Critical works is designed not to establish a system of metaphysics itself, but to prepare the foundation upon which to construct the building of metaphysics, so also the title of Religion ought to remind us that this book is designed more as the Critical (or even transcendental) prolegomena to real (empirical) religion, than as an attempt to replace all empirical manifestations of religion with a "pure" alternative.
On its own, of course, a proper understanding of the title of Religion does not constitute a conclusive argument on the basis of which we could answer the question with which we are here concerned. Rather, it only provides us with hints which may or may not prove to shed new light on the text itself. Let us therefore turn our attention now to the beginning of the first Preface, where Kant is often interpreted as saying religion is just a kind of footnote or appendage to morality.
In the first few paragraphs of this Preface, Kant asserts:
... morality ... stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over [man] , for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself ... Hence for its own sake morality does not need religion at all ...; ... it is self-sufficient ... But although for its own sake morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to such an end, taken not as the ground, but as the inevitable consequence of maxims adopted as conformable to that end ... Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end (Religion 3 -6/3 -6, emphasis added).
Three key points arise out of this passage. Each of these leads to eliminative reductionism if it is just slightly misinterpreted. In what follows, therefore, I will attempt to explain not only what Kant is trying to say in each case, but also how his words are misconstrued by the traditional interpretation.
First, Kant is saying that even though morality is logically, or perhaps transcendentally self-sufficient (i. e., even though no reference to religion is needed to explain what morality is), morality is nevertheless teleologically incomplete (i. e., its ultimate purpose cannot be realized by remaining merely within its own bounds). Just as the foundation of a building is "complete" in the sense that it can stand all on its own, and does not depend on anything prior to it in order to serve its purpose, and yet its purpose is not complete until an actual building is constructed upon it, so also the nature of moral action can be understood apart from any reference to religion, and yet the purpose of morality in general, as well as the actual fulfillment of the task morality presents to us, cannot be understood without stepping beyond the exclusively moral standpoint to adopt a new, religious standpoint, based on the moral. This point is sure to be misunderstood if we fail to take special note of Kant's distinction between the "ground" and "consequence" (or "end") of morality. When Kant says morality "leads to religion", he does not mean religion can therefore be explained away in terms of morality; on the contrary, he means religion as such fulfills a necessary function. As far as its "ground" is concerned, morality is "selfsufficient": all we need is our own (human) practical reason. But as far as its "consequence" is concerned, we must look beyond mere morality in hopes of finding some third thing which can bridge the gap between the theoretical and the practical. And that "third thing", in Religion, is religion.
The common view that for Kant true religion is entirely humanistic (man-centered) [see note 4 above] neglects the fact that in this passage he says morality necessarily "extends itself", or points beyond itself, to the idea of a God. The "final end (of creation)" to which Kant refers is undoubtedly mankind.
8 However, the second point arising out of this passage is that an entirely man-centered philosophy is not the type that best serves the interests of mankind. Rather, the purpose of morality (which is man-centered) will best be fulfilled by viewing morality in terms of something outside man. Within Kant's moral system, the idea of God had to be introduced as a postulate just to conceive of the possibility of reaching the goal of establishing the highest good. Now he is saying the only way morality can fulfill its purpose is to regard this possibility (i. e., the postulate of the existence of God) as an actuality. In other words, only if we interpret our moral experience as one which is guided by a Being who shares with us a common goal do we have any hope of completing the task morality sets for us. This extension of religion beyond morality into the realm of empirical reality is implied when Kant says: "Morality as such is ideal, but religion imbues it with vigour, beauty, and reality." Once the ideological function of Religion is fully appreciated, a third point can be drawn out of the passage quoted from the first Preface. The function of Religion in Kant's philosophical System is related most closely to the function of the third Critique (which is to synthesize the theoretical and practical aspects of the first two Critiques). Accordingly, the relationships between the three parts of Kant's Critical System can be pictured in the following way:
Both Religion and the third Critique try to answer the third question which Kant says characterizes the tasks of the philosopher: "What may I hope?" 10 Indeed, I believe part of Kant's reason for writing Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason was that he realized the third Critique, published three years earlier, did not provide a sufficient answer to this question. If so, then Religion can be regarded as his new attempt to complete the Critical part of his System. A careful examination of Kant's various definitions of "religion" will not only support the above suggestion as to the proper place of Religion in Kant's System, but will provide the context for a proper understanding of Kant's "official" definition in Religion. In his Lectures on Education Kant defines religion as "the [moral] law in us, so far as it is imprinted upon us by a legislator and a judge; it is morality applied to the knowledge of God [i.e., to theology]."
12 Conversely, he claims in Lectures on Philosophical Theology that "religion is nothing but the application of theology to morality". 13 These two statements would contradict each other if for Kant religion were simply identical to, or a sub-category of, morality. The statements are actually suggesting, on the contrary, that morality and theology are the two complementary opposites which, when combined in a synthetic unity, give rise to religion. This is why Kant can say both that "morality leads inevitably to religion" (Religion 8n/7n) and that "theology also leads directly to religion": 14 each leads to religion, because each is incomplete on its own, just as each of the first two Critiques can be said to lead to the third Critique. The religion towards which they lead must therefore clothe the "bare" body of pure moral religion with some theoretical clothing, in the form of an "historical" or "revealed" or "ecclesiastical faith" (see e.g. Religion 102 -103/94, 162/151). A real (i.e., empirical) religion which can do this without distorting the priority of the "pure religious faith" at its core can qualify for what Kant calls "the universal religion of mankind" (Religion 155/143).
If we turn now to Kant's standard definition of religion, the error lying behind the strict reductionist interpretation can easily be exposed. The fact that his definition is intended to extend morality beyond its own boundaries to theology, and then beyond both to a new, distinctively religious perspective, becomes especially obvious if we look at the context in which Kant proposes his definition: Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine commands. That religion in which I must know in advance that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as my duty, is the revealed religion ...; in contrast, that religion in which I must first know that something is my duty before I can accept it as a divine injunction is the natural religion.
In revealed religion, then, morality conforms to theology, while in natural religion theology conforms to morality (see Kr. d. U. 460 and Education 477/184). Kant goes on to distinguish between two types of natural religion, only the first of which would be reductive in the strict sense. He contrasts the "naturalist", who "denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation" with the "pure rationalist", who "recognizes revelation, but asserts that to know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion" (Religion 154 -55/143).
Although in the first paragraph of this section (Religion 153-5/142-3) Kant never advocates any of these views, in-the next paragraph he describes the position of the pure rationalist (which does not entail eliminative reductionism) in a way that clearly suggests his sympathy for it. The rationalist, it seems, has read the first Critique*. For he "must ... restrict himself within the limits of human insight", yet without dogmatizing, as does the naturalist (and the strict reductionist). He then contrasts his position 16 with "pure supernaturalism", which would tend towards a rather different form of strict reductionism: its proponent "holds that belief in [revelation] is necessary to the universal religion", because human duties are nothing but God's revealed will. For Kant "the question at issue" is whether the pure rationalist or the pure supernaturalist position is correct. After making this "subjective" distinction between different ways of conceiving of the "inner possibility" of religion, Kant makes another, "objective" distinction between the "characteristics" of a religion which determine how it is to be "shared widely with others" (Religion 155/143). The main characteristic of "the natural religion" is that "everyone can be convinced [of its truth] through his own reason", whereas that of "a learned religion" is that "one can convince others only through the agency of learning". Only the former can qualify as "the universal religion", because only it can be spread to all men, regardless of their educational status. He points out, however, that a religion such as Christianity might be "objectively a natural religion, though subjectively one that has been revealed" (Religion 156/144).
Seen in its proper context, Kant's definition of religion suggests the following picture of the synthetic relationship between theology, morality and religion:
16 That pure rationalism is Kant's position is further suggested by the fact that he repeatedly refers to his own task as that of discerning the nature of the "religion of pure reason" (see e.g., Religion 110/100). Moreover, Kant "recognizes revelation" in the sense that he devotes a whole section of Book Three (109 -114/100 -105) to the task of discerning the "authentic" principle for interpreting any document which purports to be revealed by God. A "revealed" religion is one which takes theology (or some form of revelation) as its sole basis, rejecting the need for any special aid from reason. A "natural" religion is one which takes morality (or some form of reason) as its sole basis, rejecting the need for any special aid from revelation. In truly Critical fashion, Kant rejects both extremes (the former being too dogmatic, the latter being too skeptical) in favor of a more moderate view which combines them, forming the idea of an empirical religion which accepts the possibility of both natural religion (objectively) and revealed religion (subjectively). Only if objective priority is given to the former (i.e., only if it is not a "learned" religion), can an empirical religion be considered as a candidate for a truly universal religion.
Kant lends further support to this interpretation in Ethics 83 -84 when he explains that "supernatural religion is not opposed to natural religion, but completes it. Natural religion is true but incomplete." It is incomplete because "true religion" is only inner, yet usually involves some outward expression:
... there is no such thing as an outer religion. All [true] religion is entirely a matter of disposition; all outward action is either a means to or an expression of the religion within us: no outward act can be a religious act; acts of religion are within us, because true religion is purely a matter of disposition (Ethics 82 -83, emphasis added).
Kant is here emphasizing the radically pure, or transcendental character of his special Critical perspective on religion: just as the first Critique lays the transcendental foundation for empirical knowledge and the second Critique lays the transcendental foundation for moral action, so also Religion lays the transcendental foundation for real (empirical) religion. However, the fact that the inner disposition must be primary does not mean that it can stand on its own. On the contrary, only the empirical religion which combines the outer and the inner in the proper way can be a universal religion. Accordingly, Kant leaves no doubt as to his position on the inadequacy of a merely inner religion in Ethics 102:
A pure religion ... consist[s] solely in dispositions which are directed towards God and imply morality. A mixed religion, in so far as it appeals to the senses, is one which is merely a means to morality. But as man is sensuous and the religious appeal to the senses has its uses, it can be said that man can have no pure religion.
This explains why, in spite of his emphasis on the primacy of true "inner" religion, Kant does not use the phrase "reinen Vernunft" in the title of Religion.
Once Kant's perspectival distinction between theology, morality and religion is clearly understood, his insistence that morality is the primary basis of religion, while theology is secondary, can be recognized as a rather straightforward application of his insistence on the "primacy of practical reason" in general: in Kant's System practical action always takes precedence over theoretical beliefs.
17 This is why he rejects all theoretical arguments for the existence of God, yet claims that his moral argument is "the only one needful for religion" (Kr. d. U. 474), so that "the only theology of reason which is possible is one that is based upon moral laws" (664). However, it is a grave mistake to include Kant's moral argument for the existence of God as part of his theory of religion, as is so often done when the latter is viewed as a mere footnote to his moral philosophy (see notes 3 and 4 above). Not only does he never repeat the moral argument as such in Religion, but he clearly goes beyond the mere possibility of God which it guarantees (see e.g., note 24 below). The faith which is the proper domain of theology is added to the knowledge which arises out of our moral nature in order to give rise to religion, in which the reality of God plays a role it never could in the moral system on its own. And the result is that the ultimate fulfillment of the moral law itself becomes possible: "In religion all our morality ought to reach its fulfilment in respect of its object" (Ethics 78-79).
This perspectival interpretation of Kant's definition of religion puts it in a new light. When Kant says religion is the recognition of duties as divine commands, he is not secretly thinking "But we enlightened folks all know that they are actually nothing but human duties in disguise." Rather, he is implying that the only way to make sense out of man's universal experience of inwardly compelling duty, and the only way to imagine how the enormous task it presents to us can be fulfilled, given the factual reality of "radical evil in human nature" (Religion 19 -44/15 -39), is to view these duties as if they are commanded by God Himself (though, of course, this can never be a matter of theoretical knowledge). This is why he says we must view our duties as divine (not just human) commands: we must view them as being connected (via the moral law within us) to a higher Power outside us (though not outside Reason, lest they be heteronomous) or we will never be able to achieve their fulfillment. This fulfillment, according to Kant, is the heart and the hope of true religion. 
III. An Outline of Kant's System of Religion
If the foregoing interpretation is correct, then the usual assumption, that Religion simply restates and expands the essentials of Kant's theory of morality in the second Critique, is clearly mistaken. Instead, Religion ought to be viewed as itself a kind of transcendental Critique of Religion -i.e., as an attempt to delineate the boundary between true religion and false religion by setting forth the necessary conditions for the possibility of religious experience. And this is, indeed, precisely what Kant does. When he explains this in the Preface to the second edition of Religion, he adds that his experiment will actually be twofold: first, to discover the rational conditions for the possibility of religion; and second to test one particular religious faith, viz. Christianity, to see how closely it conforms to these conditions. Assessing the success of the latter experiment would be too complex a task to attempt here. Kant's exposition is clear enough, however, so that a general look at the former will enable us to determine more precisely the extent to which Kant's rational system of religion is or is not reductive.
Religion is divided into four "Books", each of which develops one "stage" (as I shall call it) in Kant's systematic exposition of the nature of religion. The primary task of the first stage is to answer the question: Is human nature originally good or evil? Kant's answer is (as usual) that it depends on the perspective from which the question is asked. If the question refers to the potential which resides in every human being as a "living" (animal), "rational" (human) and "accountable" (personal) being, then we must regard human nature as originally good, because these characteristics naturally "enjoin the observance of the [moral] law" (Religion 26 -28/21-23). However, if the question refers to the actual state of every human person in their first (and subsequent) moral act(s), then we cannot avoid the conclusion that an original ("radical") evil exists in human nature. This conclusion is necessary not only if we base our judgment on "what we know of man through experience" (32/27); in addition, "it must be apprehended a priori through the concept of evil" (35/31). Thus, Kant concludes, "we may presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even the best" (32/27).
Kant's argument in stage one has not always been appreciated by his critics, who would rather gloss over it in order to emphasize the "good bits" (i. e., the bits about morality).
19 Yet this two-sided answer to the question of human nature is as crucial to Kant's theory of religion as freedom is to his theory of morality, and as time philosophy of religion would be tantamont to giving up everything distinctively philosophical in this discipline. What Edwards ignores is that a transcendental definition can be nondescriptive without being "emotive". 19 Ernst Cassirer discusses the negative reaction to Kant's doctrine of radical evil by his contemporaries in Kant's Life and Thought, pp. 391 -92. He explains, for example, that "Goethe ... remarked bitterly in a letter to Herder that Kant has disgracefully 'slobbered on' his philosopher's cloak 'with the blot of radical evil, so that even Christ would be enticed to kiss its hem '." and space are to his theory of knowledge. Kant is arguing that religion itself would not be possible if it were not true that human nature contains within it an intrinsically good purpose, and that the same human nature is nevertheless infected with an irresistible tendency towards evil. This tension sets the problem which all religion tries to solve. So, without these two conditions, religion would never have appeared.
Evil is necessary to every man, and that is why morality alone is insufficient. If evil were not necessary, then we could realize the goal of becoming well-pleasing to God merely by remaining in the pure (moral) part of Kant's System. But in his religious system Kant insists right at the outset that we must recognize our inability to reach the goal in this way: we need more than mere morality, because nobody is perfect. We are all corrupted by radical evil. The second stage in Kant's religious system responds to the initial limiting conditions set out in stage one by examining "the conflict of the good with the evil principle for sovereignty over man" (Religion 57/50). The question Kant is trying to answer in Book Two is: How can an evil person become good? The answer which interpreters have traditionally assumed Kant to be giving is that man becomes good by acting in a good way, by obeying the moral law. This, once again, is a subtle miscontrual of the solution Kant actually offers. How does an evil heart become a good heart? Kant summarizes his answer in Religion 45 -47/40 -3):
For despite the fall, the injunction that we ought to become better men resounds unabatedly in our souls; hence this must be within our power, even though what we are able to do is in itself inadequate and though we thereby only render ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us inscrutable, assistance ... But if a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man (pleasing to God), ... this cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims [i. e., the "heart"] remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition ... He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation ..., and a change of heart. Kant is here making two main points. The first is that, no matter how good we are, we cannot be good enough to please God (i.e., to fulfill the moral law) in every one of our actions. "What we are able to do is in itself inadequate"! Then what is the importance of morality at all? Kant says that by acting morally we render ourselves susceptible of "higher and, for us [i. e., for bare reason] inscrutable assistance". Another way of saying the same thing is that grace is a necessary condition of becoming good. Kant supports this position explicitly in Religion 75-76/70: 20 Here, then, is that surplus ... over and above the profit from good works, and it is itself a profit which is reckoned to us by grace. That what in our earthly life ... is ever only a becoming (namely, becoming a man well-pleasing to God) should be credited to us exactly as if we were already in full possession of it -to this we have no legal claim ... Thus the decree is always one of grace alone ... Such a manifestation of grace occurs as a part of the conversion experience of the religious believer: even though we are not fully good, we are regarded as good by God. Kant almost seems to be defending the Lutheran position that man is saved by grace alone, not by worksl This is slightly misleading, however, because he does not actually say "not by works"-, rather, he says both works and grace are necessary. Good works are necessary from the moral perspective of practical reason; and grace is necessary from the non-moral perspective of theoretical reason. Kant's view is that, if salvation is going to happen, both of these requirements must be met.
The question this raises is: What is the proper order? From one point of view, grace must come first, because there is no way a person can erase the evil deeds he or she has already done, and evil is the first moral action performed by every person. God must take the initiative. But how does this happen? Kant says bare reason cannot answer this question. All we can do is to recognize the space left open by reason, which needs to be filled. Filling this space is not an optional extra, intended only for those who need a crutch; rather, it must be filled in some way by God's grace if man is to become well-pleasing to God. Naked reason cannot tell us the exact way in which this will happen. Only faith, as a complement to the inadequacy of our theoretical reason, can pave the way for such a disclosure.
Kant's theory of this "space" is expressed primarily in terms of what he calls the "archetype of perfect humanity". The grace of God, from the point of view of bare reason, can only be regarded as an archetype. By "archetype" Kant means that every human being has a kind of inner "space", ready and waiting to be filled by the grace of God. But nothing in our reason can guarantee the actual filling of that space. The problem, Kant says, is that we are not able to see clearly into the depths of the human heart -not even our own heart. So there is no way we can know for sure whether or not God has actually manifested his grace to us, or whether we have accepted it completely (see e. g. Religion 51/46, 67 -69/61 -62). We cannot tell for sure whether or not the "space" we have in our reason has actually been filled. So what can we do? Kant says what we must do is to adopt what he calls "practical faith".
In a nutshell, Kant's notion of practical faith says this: Try your best, and trust that God will do the rest. That is, do your moral duty as often as you can, follow the moral law in your heart, but never fool yourself into believing that this alone will save you, because you will always fall short. Kant stresses this idea time after time;
21 and yet, whenever he says it, strict reductionist interpreters sweep his comments off to one side and surmise "Well, he must have been trying to please the governmental authorities of the established church, who were threatening to censor his work. He couldn't have believed that*" 22 Yet this kind of selective interpretation is unjustified, particularly at this point, where Kant is expounding the very heart of his entire philosophical System. We can therefore summarize Kant's argument in stage two as follows. Kant is saying that, although we can never make ourselves worthy to be accepted by God, we can make ourselves worthy to be made acceptable by God. This is the proper relationship, according to Kant, between good works and grace.
23 Doing good works -trying to live a good life -is the rational basis upon which we can conceive of ourselves as having received God's grace. For our moral action is based on the same disposition through which we open ourselves up to the possibility of having our immoral deeds covered up by God.
22 Religion was published just as the new king (Frederick William II) was tightening his grip on academia through a program of strict religious censorship. The idea of some interpreters, that in Religion Kant sometimes softens his real views, or writes with a twist of irony, in hopes of appeasing the authorities, is not only an unfounded insult to Kant's integrity, but would also indicate a profound inability on Kant's part to judge what would actually offend the authorities! For Kant was severely reprimanded for the views he expressed in Religion, which were interpreted as being subversive to the established Church's interpretation of Christianity. He responded by loyally promising the king he would never again publish or speak publicly on the subject of religion during his reign. After the king's death, he promptly resumed his public stance on religion, since his vow referred only to his duty as a servant of that particular king -a fortunate decision indeed for posterity, since Conflict provides an invaluable inside look at Kant's own understanding of how Religion ought to be interpreted. He explains and defends this decision in Conflict 5-11, and includes an explicit statement (9-10) indicating the seriousness with which he composed his writings: "I always pictured this judge [viz., the voice of God speaking through the conscience] as standing at my side to keep me not only from error that corrupts the soul, but even from any careless expression that might give offense." 23 Kant himself actually provides in Religion 115 -20/106 -11 a compelling solution to the traditional problem of the conflict between faith and works. As we shall see, he distinguishes in stage four between truly good works (i. e., morally good actions) and works which are wrongly believed to be good because they are done solely on God's behalf (see e. g. Religion 106/97). Kant's response to Luther would have been to say he was right for rejecting the Catholic church's belief that works of the latter type (i. e., churchly activities) could be in themselves salvific, but wrong to "throw out the baby with the bathwater" by also rejecting the necessity of truly moral deeds. From man's point of view, the latter provide the proper basis for our hope in salvation, even though, with Luther, Kant agrees that they could never be sufficient from God's point of view (cf. note 21). Thus, the conflict between truly good works and true faith is only apparent, once we recognize their perspectival relationship (Religion 119/110): they "are not two principles which in themselves so differ that to begin with the one, or the other, would be to enter upon opposing paths, but only one and the same practical idea ... representing the archetype now as found in God and proceeding from Him [to which man responds with faith as the basis for good works], and now, as found in us [to which man responds with good works as the basis for faith], but in both instances as the gauge for our course of life. The antinomy is only apparant, since ... it regards the self-same practical idea, taken merely in different references [i. e., from different perspectives], as two different principles."
Up until this point Kant's religious system has been concerned only with the salvation of the individual believer. But in stage three he argues that "the victory of the good over the evil principle, and the founding of a kingdom of God on earth" (Religion 93/85) can occur only in the context of a community. Therefore, the questions to be answered in Book Three all revolve around the issue of the nature and justification of such a community, regarded as a necessarily religious institution. Why do we need such a community? Because when a converted person lives in close proximity to other people -even if these others are also trying to live good lives -they will inevitably have a corrupting influence on each other. The radical evil in their nature as human beings will still corrupt the goodness of the individual's deeds . (Presumably Kant is thinking here of inter-personal conflicts such as jealousy, selfishness, etc.) For this reason, people seeking to live a good life need to join together in the form of what Kant calls an "ethical commonwealth". In other words, we need to come together and make an agreement to cooperate, based on moral laws (95 -98/87 -89) .
The strict reductionist interpretation of Kant stops at this point: it says the ethical commonwealth is Kant's description of how the unity of pure moral religion can come about. But Kant himself actually says the ethical commonwealth on its own is an insufficient basis for the realization of true religion. Why? Because the people who unite together in this way must work according to the additional assumption that the same Being, or the same Source, is at the root of their internally prescribed moral commands. And the only way to believe this is to believe there is a God who guides all of the members of such a group together.
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On this basis Kant concludes that the ethical commonwealth will work only when it is viewed as an invisible "People of God" who come together under the idea of a church, each member of which receives in his or her own heart individual guidance from God. Ultimately, the level of cooperation between the people joined together in such a community will therefore be determined by the extent to which each person receives guidance from the same Absolute Being. Nevertheless, this need to rely on God for the final realization of man's highest good does not release man from responsibility. On the contrary, Kant stresses in Religion 100 -102/91-93 that the true church must have a definite (archetypal) form through "human 24 This argument, found in Religion 97 -100/89 -91, can be regarded as a kind of "religious proof" for the existence of God. Kant's argument can be paraphrased as follows: (1) it is a duty of the human race towards itself to promote the highest good; (2) no individual can achieve this goal alone; (3) therefore an ethical commonwealth is necessary; (4) in order to be ethical, the legislation binding the members together must be internal (not political); (5) we cannot see how it could be within man's power to unite the disposition of all people into such a whole; (6) anything the moral law commands must be possible to realize; (7) therefore, it is necessary to presuppose the idea "of a higher moral Being through whose universal dispensation the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in themselves, are united for a common end" (98/89).
organization" 9 following (like everything transcendental) the pattern of the categories:
To found a moral people of God is ... a task whose consummation can be looked for not from men but only from God Himself [emphasis added]. Yet man ... must proceed as though everything depended upon him ... The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by men. The requirements ... are the following: 1. Universality, and hence its numerical oneness-, ... 2. Its nature (quality), i.e., purity, union under no motivating forces other than moral ones ... 3. Its relation under the principle of freedom-, ... 4. Its modality, the unchangeableness of its constitution ... Kant concludes his system of religion in stage four by asking how we can determine whether or not a particular example of empirical religion is genuine. In order to distinguish between false religion and true religion, he offers the following principle:
I take the following proposition to be a principle requiring no proof: Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion and pseudo-service of God. I say, what man believes that he can do; for here it is not denied that beyond all that we can do there may be something in the mysteries of the highest wisdom that God alone can do to transform us into men well-pleasing to Him ... But is there not also perhaps a dizzying illusion of virtue ...? No! The disposition of virtue occupies itself with something real which of itself is well-pleasing to God and which harmonizes with the world's highest good. True, an illusion of self-sufficiency may attach itself thereto, an illusion of regarding oneself as measuring up to the idea of one's holy duty; but this is merely contingent" (Religion 170-173/158-161).
Traditionally, passages such as this have been interpreted along the lines of strict (eliminative) reductionism: Kant is believed to be saying that nothing besides morality counts, so we can throw away everything else. But this is not what he says! On the contrary, he explicitly states that we can never hope to behave well enough to "measure up" completely to the required standard. He is arguing that anything completely detached from morality is not part of true religion. Nevertheless, elsewhere in Book IV he explains that there is a proper place for non-moral aspects of religion, for things in our empirical religion which are related to faith, but are not in themselves morally good or bad. These do have a proper place as long as we keep them attached to morality, as long as there is a definite connection between such non-moral religious activities or beliefs and the moral core of religion. Thus Kant's principle entails that non-moral religious activity can be a legitimate part of the true (universal) religion only if it serves as a means for deepening or quickening a person's moral disposition.
The error against which Kant's principle is protecting is not that of admitting non-moral aspects into an empirical religion; rather it is that of reversing the priority of the moral over the non-moral, by viewing the latter not merely as the means to a moral end, but as themselves the objective condition for God's acceptance.
Hence whoever assigns priority to obedience to statutory laws, requiring a revelation, as being necessary to religion, and regards this obedience not merely as a means to the moral disposition but as the objective condition of becoming immediately well-pleasing to God, and whoever thus places endeavor toward a good course of life below this historical faith (instead of requiring the latter, which can be well-pleasing to God only conditionally, to adapt itself to the former, which alone is intrinsically well-pleasing to Him) -whoever does this transforms the service of God into a mere fetishism and practises a pseudo-service which is subversive to all endeavors toward true religion. So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a moral service" (Religion 178-179/166 -167).
Here Kant is not equating non-moral activities to false religion, and moral activities to true religion, as the strict reductionist interpretation would have it. Rather, he is describing true religion as the combination of these two elements in their proper order. From our point of view as human beings, morality is the first basis, the foundation of our building of religion, whereas faith and non-moral religious activities constitute the building itself. False religion is the belief that some theoretical (i.e., non-moral) belief or idea is the basis, the foundation, and that morality just comes as a kind of extra, second thing -or maybe even not at all. But if the priorities are right, then both the moral and the non-moral can cooperate as proper elements in true religion.
IV. Conclusion: Raising Morality to the Status of Religion
This more balanced way of interpreting Kant's intentions enables us to make an accurate evaluation of the extent to which his two experiments are successful. I believe both are far more successful than the traditional myth would lead us to believe. Unfortunately, an account of how Kant carries out his first experiment by arguing for the the details of the four stages in his system of religion, and of how he carries out his second experiment by relating his theory to the Christian religion as a test case, is far beyond the scope of this article. My own conclusion, after carrying out such a detailed study of Religion (see note 11), is that the answers Kant gives to the wide range of questions which occupy his attention in Religion go far beyond the simple idea that religion is just morality in disguise.
A brief look at three issues of special importance can serve as a tantalizing preview of the implications of the perspectival interpretation of Kant's religious system outlined in section III. Kant's views concerning the divinity of Jesus, the efficacy of prayer, and the authority of the Bible as a divine revelation have typically been taken to be contrary, if not hostile, to the traditional Christian doctrines. Although Kant certainly does not defend the orthodox views, the strict reductionist interpretation has blinded many readers to the fact that he also does not deny the validity of such doctrines, but rather offers a new, more moderate explanation of their validity. In each case, his explanations of such doctrines promote (what I call) a kind of "liberating conservatism" and "conserving liberalism" (in opposition of the usual extremes of an exclusively conservative or liberal interpretation of Christian doctrine). pure (and hence, necessary) core of all true religion. But as we have seen time and time again, he does this because he recognizes that only if morality is raised to the status of religion will it be able to fulfill its own goals! Far from requiring the elimination of all non-moral elements, Kant's approach rather guarantees their potential value by rooting them in the only human soil in which non-moral religious beliefs and practises can grow and flourish.
Did Kant therefore reduce religion to morality? Perhaps the best way to answer this question is with another question. Did Jesus and the writers of the Bible reduce religion to morality? Our answer to the latter question ought, I believe, to be the same as our answer to the former. For Kant's view of religion is essentially the same as, for example, the prophet who asks 
